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Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections

Abstract : We compare the Condorcet Efficiencies of the plurality rule, the negative plurality rule, and the Borda rule to examine what might be gained by using a voting rule that requires candidate rankings. Previous analyses have considered (1) voting situations for which the three rules determine different candidates as winners (and the Condorcet Efficiencies might actually differ across the three rules) as well as (2) refined measures of Group Mutual Coherence that assess the presence of underlying models of rational behavior that governs voter preferences. In this paper, we present the final step of this particular line of analysis by analyzing (1) and (2) simultaneously. We conclude that there is a considerable benefit on the basis of Condorcet Efficiency from asking voters to submit candidate rankings in three-candidate elections.
Keywords : Economics
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Submitted on : Thursday, February 2, 2017 - 6:37:06 AM
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William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley, Florenz Plassmann. Further Support for Ranking Candidates in Elections. Group Decision and Negotiation, INFORMS, 2016, 25 (5), pp.941--966. ⟨10.1007/s10726-016-9470-1⟩. ⟨hal-01452552⟩



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