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Christiane Rafidinarivo

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SECURITY REFORM OF FRANCE AFRICAN POLICY COOPERATION: INCREMENTAL PROCESS

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ABSTRACT

The first generation of cooperation agreements and their security clauses in Francophone Africa was bilateral. The specific characteristic of such clauses was the secret component of part of the defense and security agreements, often applied according to the “away from the public eye” principle. The concept of bilateral cooperation translated into ensuring the security of the African countries, the regimes in place and the French interests in the face of external and internal threats. It was a matter of ensuring Francophone Africa’s political stability, homogeneity and coherence, which would be favourable to French and African partners transactions.

This kind of bilateral agreement was much criticized and contested. On the one hand, it was considered as being allegedly a “reproduction of colonial relations” favourable to “Françafrique” network. On the other hand, it met with increasing competition from the great powers as well as from emerging powers. Its decline was also due to multiple levels and stakeholders of international relations and global democratisation. Interdependencies are being intensified, setting off “reverse” flows of influence from African players to French African policy. The context of this evolved contestation and new geopolitics is mainly increasing multilateralism; emergence of regionalism; development of European defense and diplomacy; fight against terrorism and burden sharing reorganization.

The aim of this article is to clarify how the second generation of cooperation agreements and their security clauses reforms is a part of an incremental reform process. Financial and economic crisis are tightening French cooperation and defense budgets. “Behind the economic crisis, the political crisis” is appearing in Africa just as it is within its partners. Diplomatic, budgetary and security dynamics are thus forcing France, on the one hand to explore substitution strategies, including coalition and on the other, to prioritise its alliances and multilateralism. Is this Africa security building, a new realism and/or a new international institutionalism? Last decade, new geopolitics is merging as results of new ways of trade, invest, war and cooperation. How African security policies are building response to risks, threats and opportunities in a new open world game?

Key words: International relations, France African policy cooperation, incremental reform, defense, security, terrorism.
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For each public actor’s decision, African policy reform may to be done with opportunity and constraint of increment proceedings. This incremental process reform is main stream on France African policy since several decades as security cooperation with Africans and especially Francophone Africa. Enough to save or to loose it and how?

INTRODUCTION

Conflicts have been diminishing steadily in Africa for more than a decade as a result of the peace, security and stabilisation policies implemented by the African Union, regional organisations and partners of the AU. Times have changed, new risks and new threats appear, crises develop. The nature of conflicts and war have changed, they are no longer part of an institution. Non-State and intrastate armed conflicts are developing. They generate human insecurity and a new state of war, warfare, in the world. The consequences are a militarization of Africa which sees the growing intervention of non-Western powers. But today something else has also changed; the internal functioning of states is in close interaction with the international balance of power. Change has also affected international law and multilateral frameworks. African leaders have become masters of the game, able to reverse influences like those of the Françafrique. the inner workings of states, interacting closely with the international balances of power, have also changed along with international law and multilateral frameworks. African leaders have become game masters and are able to reverse influences such as those of Françafrique.

Insecure populations are seeking protection. African states seek internal/external security and international security capacity building. France can offer its own, which is for now unique involving permanent intervention and projection in Africa. Security can thus be improved on a political decision by the implementation of international agreements by incrementation method: more security (or less insecurity) and implemented actions.

Each one reviews, sometimes urgently, the agreements allowing the action of security and its legitimation. They are institutional or ad hoc, formal, even informal. The action may be bilateral, international or multilateral. Its legitimation has a double national and international dimension.

In this context, these questions were asked of all who signed the sixties cooperation agreements in Francophone Africa. What are the reforms of the African policy of France, military power? What are the interactions with international security dynamics and collective security institutions? What can be salvaged from the ruins of the colonial empire and what can be rebuilt with it? Creating states, certainly; making them true sovereign states in jure, certainly; involving them in international relations, definitely; safeguarding the Francophone link, most assuredly; but with what security in the balances of power? With which
sovereignty in the new competition for resources and these new international relations? And with which process: radical or incremental reforms?

In the seventies, the debate was opened. The cooperation agreements signed at the time of independence were already being criticized, contested or even denounced for their neocolonialism and paternalism. On the other hand, voices were being raised, some coming from organisations, accusing the French leaders of selling off Africa to the detriment of France’s interests and its prestige. As for the postcolonial debate, it redefined independence: problems were discussed independently of or without reference to colonisation. It was more virulent in the Anglophone world than in the Francophone world. There was also internal criticism in France from the public opinion following the mobilization of civil societies. At the state institution level, in the French parliament there was caution: questions were asked to the government; committee reports; development of parliamentary cooperation. Cooperation agreements were renegotiated several times at the initiative of the decolonized countries within these paradigmatic balances of power. It was without necessarily raising the ambiguities and violence arising from colonisation.

Furthermore, the tensions and conflicts around the race to gain spatial control of international flows are long-term and/or paroxysmal structural elements of cooperation agreements. The nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egypt in 1957, for example, triggered a Franco-British-Israeli expedition. The result was a military victory, but the two great powers imposed a political withdrawal. That is how France decided to invest in nuclear construction on the one hand, and in building Europe within the framework of the Treaty of Rome, signed the same year, on the other. The oil price shocks of the nineteen-seventies against the background of the Cold War led France to prioritise the development of nuclear energy in readjusting its energy mix. Its African policy cooperation became strategic in its diplomatic mix. It was also during this period that the cooperation agreements from the time of independence were revised. The recent “financial shocks” compel France, along with all the great powers, to reform its security and defense policy according to budget restraints.

It is for this reason that the security and defense component has always been an important element of France cooperation agreements with African countries. This component interacts with strategic investments and procurement, the nationals, the exclusive economic zones and free trade. It has long been characterised by internal and external interaction with France security support given to African countries. It includes a strong interpersonal dimension with the leaders and a marked institutional dimension with the governments. Secret clauses are the rule. Decisions for intervention are mainly at the discretion of France and many operations are done by "professionnals away from public eyes". Formal and informal security, political and economic networks are interwoven. These are often criticized for their lack of transparency and their methods referred to as “Françafrique”. This derogatory label is analyzed as smacking of the “colonial pact” to the detriment of a national “social contract”.

This research explores empirical and theoretical incrementalism on security cooperation issues. Since the end of the Cold War, security has taken on a global dimension that reorganizes its relocation voluntarily or spontaneously. The theoretical debate is changing. In the case of internationalists, on the one hand realists focus on state actions while others analyze security as social construction and human interaction. Security includes dimensions of integration but also of contestation of globalization, liberalism and the West carrying these models. The state appears absorbed by the market in these new complex international interdependencies. Integration is a mode of interdependence perceived as subordination and
contrary to national interests. For realists, interdependence is a mutual vulnerability and leads to the reconfirmation of the predominant role of the state. For neo-institutionalists, the asymmetrical interdependence source of conflicts can be regulated in the decision-making processes on the criteria of risks, costs and gains. It is found in public expenditure negotiation procedures. The neo-functionalists emphasize the functional utility of cooperation, especially regional cooperation, and neo-keynesians on the interactions between asymmetry, institutionalization of change or breaks in fundamental decisions, or even a flip-flop, and "uturns".

Theories of rational change develop models of the rational actor and rationality limited by information asymmetry and / or the institutional frameworks of action. They explain the institutional routines and the usual evolutions, except elections for example or unforeseen events. Thus incrementalism applies to public policies and political decision-making processes. Budget incrementalism analyzes the adjustments according to available means and needs. We speak of fragmentary incrementalism, "disjoined". Empirical studies, however, reveal that security dynamics are both routine and emerging. The problems that form and fit on the political agenda because the actors respond to them generate abrupt changes or breaks. They are also called reforms when these responses are brought and planned by the institutions. Internationalist models include devices that take into account real threats and the structuring force of security practices. The theory of point equilibria fiscally analyzes multiple incremental dimensions and important changes.

Our research on political and security cooperation interactions develops a framework with two approaches: by public actions and policies and by international relations. In the reforms of the France African policy, it is possible to distinguish security increments from abrupt breaks or changes. One can also analyze how these institutions became institutionalized and generate incremental reforms or how security increments lead to profound changes that are real breakthroughs. On the other hand, how does budget rationalization generate incrementality or the limit? How and to what extent does it institutionalize incremental security practices, especially the exceptional measures that face urgency, characteristics of security?

From the point of view of international relations, our research puts into perspective the reforms of the French policy towards Africa on two models: on the one hand the European relations characterized by incremental cooperative security and on the other hand, the transatlantic relations and the debate on the "burden-sharing" regarding safety. Basically, we are asking about the interactions between security increments and policy increments, and also between incrementation and change. Our hypothesis is that incremental process in security cooperation between France and African partners is arising new types of security cooperation agreements. Our main question is how does it occur? We explore budgetary incrementalism method that describes top-down, bottom-up and in-between budget processes to focus on the security cooperation issues. Our results identify four types of incremental processes of security cooperation, formalized or not in a cooperation agreement:

- Incrementing security structure and breaks
- Budget rationalisation and security increments institutionalisation
- European relations, cooperative increments and new geopolitics
- Discussions on incrementing burden-sharing.
1. Incrementing security structure and breaks

In 2011, the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and Armed Forces issues an information report on France African Policy. Reforms have unequal levels of achievement in three decades. Sometimes ruptures, which are often incremental, are step by step, structuring of the African policy of France, especially when it comes to "saving" Africa, "protect", or "not occupying it" which means also, not to lose it. Three "inflections" are identified. What are they? What are the interactions with the international security dynamics?

A “democratic inflection” was achieved by President François Mitterrand, symbolised by his La Baule speech in 1990. It derogated from the sacrosanct conservative doctrine of Africa’s stability. François Mitterrand intended to make French aid subject to a political condition of democratisation. Nearly twenty years later, in 2008, the National Assembly had come to a very critical assessment. France’s power and influence in Africa were receding, indeed collapsing, to the benefit of very dynamic competitors: the United States, China and the powers emerging since the fall of the Berlin Wall.

However, the Mitterrandian “democratic conditionality” is found in the international action of France. It includes diplomatic action in favor of democratic elections in its plans to end crises and securisation. French diplomacy maintains contacts with oppositions regardless of positions taken for decision for their supports. This is a safe security stabilization policy. The condition of its perpetuation is presented as political and the confirmation of its ongoing existence, democratic. In any case, it is a strategy of reintegration of opponents, even enemies, in the political field. Some see this approach as an opening or a promotion of the values of left, others a realistic behaviorism: whatever the political cases, put in place the conditions of "welfare dependence: manage your own dependence".

A "structural inflection" is led by President Jacques Chirac in 1995. It is about "reforming the instruments of cooperation" to remain the main donor of sub-Saharan Africa and to combine stability and development. It is in this context that Recamp is set up in 1998. It is an Africanized (African Union), a Europeanized (European Union) and regionalized military device. It is characterized by its multilateralism type French presence in Africa in a European force under UN mandate in support of African forces. The French President defines the new line of security cooperation of France: "it is your destiny, it is your responsibility". It is based on the renunciation of France to direct interventions in Africa and "a recognition of security Africa by Africa".

France is now intervening only at the call of African institutions in order to "strengthen African peacekeeping capabilities". A framework for the organization and subregional reinforcement of the security authorities is set up by the AU evolving by incrementation and rise in power. At its request, African peacekeeping brigades with headquarters are trained by Recamp. Subsequently, African Standby Forces are structured.

A decade later, President Nicolas Sarkozy announces the break. He declares that France will no longer be "the gendarme of Africa“ and launches a new reform of the France African policy in his Cape Town speech. He chose to do so in 2008 in English-speaking South Africa, the continent's leading economy. It announces the new formula: break with the françafrique, renegotiation of the security and defense agreements, priority to the private sector.
Economic diplomacy becomes an official line of Foreign Affairs and the State Secretariat for Trade is attached to it as well as that of Development and Francophonie. If President Nicolas Sarkozy had a State Secretariat for Cooperation, it no longer exists under President François Hollande. The France African policy is the reserved domain of the President of the Republic. But how to qualify the military interventions of France in Africa since 2011 in Côte d'Ivoire, Libya, Mali, Central Africa?

In 2011, according to the report to the Senate, it is "the inflection of globalization" that President Nicolas Sarkozy brought to France African policy. "Inflection" which he himself describes as "rupture". France officially adheres to the refusals of coups and unconstitutional changes in the democratic transition dynamics of the continent. It helps the African Union interact with subregional organizations to build architecture of peace and regional security. It declares to renegotiate the bilateral agreements without secret clauses.

Internally, France African policy is subject to the democratic control of parliament. This is a driving of force in the French political reforms of Nicolas Sarkozy's presidential mandate. Regarding its security dimensions, this control is to be measured because the interventions in Africa are most of the time the subject to the republican union in the parliament. In addition, the urgency of decision-making and action is often invoked in opposition to the slowness of the parliamentary control process. The politico-military decision-making process in France is much shorter than in the parliamentary system because of the presidential power.

Several years later, the facts, in terms of what has been accomplished, echo the diagnosis of the report to the National Assembly: “French policy with regard to the African continent has, indeed, regularly oscillated between “(...) a policy of power (interventionism within the “pré-carré”, the Francophonie; the African countries’ support for France within the framework of the UN; utilisation of the leftovers from the Françafrique networks) and normalised relations (reduced proximity with the Francophone countries; Europeanisation and stronger presence on the largest African markets such as South Africa, Nigeria or Angola). These hesitations resulted in certain contradictions in the implementation of the adopted approaches, possibly damaging France’s image in Africa.” This is compounded by the growing indifference towards Africa among public opinion, the political class and French firms. Among Africans there is continued interest in cooperating with France, albeit in a now more competitive and critical way.

Continuing however the efforts of rationalization, François Hollande, President from the Left, increments the important reform of the French intelligence initiated by President Nicolas Sarkozy. It is difficult to measure the African dimension but it is certain that it is not without impact. The President does not question the (re) anchoring of intelligence in French and European law, qualified as legalism by some, legitimacy by others. It complements parliament’s control over government intelligence policy. A bicameral delegation is set up for this purpose. An Inspectorate of Intelligence Services is created by decree on July 27, 2014, a first under the Republic.

The mission of knowledge and anticipation is assigned to the French Community of Intelligence, CFR, which is granted 1 billion euros of budget. President François Hollande maintains the function of national intelligence coordinator directly attached to him and ensures the implementation of the decisions of the National Council of Intelligence involving the Prime Minister, 3 ministries, 7 intelligence directorates forming the CFR and the services of the National Gendarmerie, Territorial Intelligence and the Prefecture of Paris. It is an
organization that strengthens internal and external security interactions. The dynamics of the CFR are often presented as the necessities of counter-terrorism, cyberwar, counter-espionage, economic investigations in the context of the development of terrorism, not only in Africa. They can take ad hoc forms such as international intelligence platforms in the Sahel or the Indian Ocean. They are mostly institutional.

An Intelligence Academy for training and cohesion missions of the CRF was created in 2014, which depended on the Prime Minister and the budget of 450,000 euros. The two largest budgets of the CFR are those of the DGSE and the DGSI. That of the Directorate General of External Services, increased by 50% between 2009 and 2013: 651 million euros and 58.7 million secret funds under the Prime Minister. It is the only one authorized to carry out clandestine operations. The Central Directorate of Internal Intelligence created in 2008 is replaced in 2014 by the DGSI, Directorate General of Internal Security, now reporting to the Minister of the Interior and the estimated budget of 200 million euros excluding secret funds\(^{24}\). An important part of its action is the anti-jihad plan to which France intends to give a European dimension.

As for multilateralism, it is supposed to work towards the normalisation of relations between states and between the AU and EU blocs. What are the dynamics of multilateralism in the context of an eventual overarching African policy on issues such as climate change, natural and technological risks, the cybersphere or terrorism? The EU provided 600 million euros to the European Peace Facility for Africa between 2003 and 2010. It supported peace-keeping operations by the AU as in Darfur, Sudan. It led military operations such as Artemis, EUSEC, EUFOR and EUPOL in the DRC, EUFOR-Chad, EUTM in Somalia in support of the UN forces and in lawless areas like the Central African Republic, EUFOR-CAR\(^{25}\). As in Darfur, Sudan, it supported peacekeeping operations by the African Union.

Successive breaks and security increments have resulted in an African policy in which two generations of cooperation, security and defense agreements interact. The first is resolutely bilateral. The second is increasingly multilateral, regional, interregional and global. The one is an integral part of international relations on which the nation-state has the monopoly. The other is in a world where other players in international relations are gaining prominence. To be a major player, the nation-state must be active in complex networks to the maximum extent possible. These networks are increasingly globalised. Balances of power and budgetary constraints demand more joint efforts and transparency.

Nevertheless, some reflux can be observed. The analysis of French interventions in Africa since 2009 reveals a decreasing role of the EU compared with the period 2003 to 2008\(^{26}\). In fact, this was due to the Europeanization and the increasing multilateralization of military operations in Africa (UN, NATO, AU, EU). The French interventions in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya in 2011 were made, certainly not against, but without the EU. The 2013 report of Operation Serval in Mali, however, according to the report of the National Assembly, reveals "a concrete mutualisation of European means, on a voluntary basis, (which) demonstrates that a pragmatic Europe of security and the defense is by no means out of reach.\(^{27}\)"

The 2010 French-British Lancaster House agreements\(^{28}\) were concluded outside the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy. This bilateralism puts forward "complementary competitiveness", with close strategic cultures. It seeks to reduce the effects of fiscal restraint and maintain global geopolitical status and influence: permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, nuclear powers (the only two in the EU) and world-class diplomats.
United Nations Resolution 1973 authorizes interventions in Libya. These are air operations conducted for the most part by the Franco-British forces. They have US support for NATO's "coalition of the willing", knowing that France has returned to command. Is it to make Europe without the European Union, and bilaterally in the multilateral? How about this “complementary competitiveness” with the Brexit and probable reorganisation of UK’s alliances, especially in Africa?

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<th>COOPERATION, SECURITY AND DEFENSE AGREEMENTS</th>
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<tr>
<td>GENERATION 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Bilateralism</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Secret clauses and hidden agendas of some defense and security agreements</td>
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<td>• Often applied according to the principle of “Professionals away from the public eye”</td>
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Source: Christiane Rafidinarivo, 2014

The degree of readability of France's international actions shows today the practice of multiple bilateralism both in its European and African policies. It sets up multifaceted and multidimensional alliances to do this. These are bilateral practices within a framework and multilateral interactions. The estimate of development aid thus becomes subject to debate. If we take into account the contributions to the European Development Fund or the Monetary Fund and the World Bank, for example, the "bilateral" aid from France would be estimated at 2/3 of all the aid it grants. The advantage is the mutualisation of costs as well as the security and political results of operations. The disadvantage is the significant loss of visibility of the aid and its political gains vis-a-vis the beneficiaries.

What is not very visible is also the mobilization in the state network by outsourcing. It is financed by the French State in a bilateral or multilateral framework. This is the case for much of the humanitarian aid or funding of private military companies, SPM. This is one of the international forms of security within the meaning of the 2008 Defense White Paper and taken up again in 2013: the multiplicity of defense and national security actors means that it is no longer the monopoly of State. It is a new concept based on the "commitment of all", State, local authorities, businesses, citizens, volunteers, as "security actors".
As a corollary to the above, French development funding is the focus of the French Development Agency. Official Development Assistance with 0.43% of GDP is a long way from achieving its objective of 0.7% set by the OECD. Great Britain, however, achieved it for the first time in 2013. The crux of France African policy tends in fact to be focused on the strategic sectors and security and defense issues. It establishes multi-faceted and multidimensional alliances within a multiple bilateralism.

Voluntarily or under pressure from international balances of power, France African policy is a stakeholder in the momentum of ad hoc bargaining structures in times of crisis. For example, France was an initiator of the International Contact Group on the fight against maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. However, it was only with reluctance at first, with its multiple bilateralism, that it joined the International Contact Group on Madagascar (ICG-M), which rallied Madagascar’s institutional and private donors in response to the political crisis in 2009. Within the ICG, international interests were regulated interactively with the negotiations with the Malagasy actors. The ICG became the ISG (International Support Group) in 2014 after the presidential and legislative elections. The international sanctions, including the freezing of international funding, were lifted.

In 2011, Thomas Mélonio published a critical book with a view to the alternation of political power in the presidential elections “Quelle politique africaine pour la France en 2012 ?” (What African policy for France in 2012?)33. “It is less well known that France was the first power, and sometimes the only one, to whitewash or acknowledge coups d’états, some of which were subsequently regularised, for example those that occurred in recent years in Guinea (Moussa Dadis Camara), in Mauritania (Mohamed Ould Abdelaziz) or in Madagascar (Andry Rajoelina). In 2011, France was again the only power represented at the inauguration of François Bozizé (Central African Republic) despite a very severe electoral observation report from the European Union. Nor did France show much restraint in its support for Idriss Déby Itno, despite the unenviable situation of the opposition in that country. In the issue of the Western Sahara conflict, France was also one of the last nations to oppose the extension of the United Nations force’s mandate so as to include the protection of human rights. The examples are too numerous to cite: this can and must change.” He proposes to end the defense agreements and Europeanise France’s permanent military presence in Africa as well as to seek new international cooperation agreements against terrorism. He stresses that despite all the declarations and legislation tabled in Parliament, “the terms of the defense agreements continue to remain unknown… and the persistence of secret clauses is manifest”.

The international sector of the French economy is characterised by its small number of players. The majority of French companies in Africa focus on energy, oil and mining. The larger ones also include construction and banking. African markets have become very competitive. France’s falling behind in the crude-oil arena in the nineteen-nineties, for example, opened the field to competitors and the struggle to reconquer the market has consequently become arduous. France’s main differentiation is its military intervention capability in Africa coupled with its defense industry and its strategic sector placed in competition with each other. Does it no longer have anything but its military might to offer to its African partners? Or is this the reengagement of an economic and financial partnership back on the offensive, or even prioritised? Without security there can be no prosperity.

To return to the initial question from a current perspective, namely “What defense and security reforms are incremented or ‘added’ one to another to produce what security
changes?”, the analysis starts this time with the 2013 French White Paper on Defense and National Security, prefaced by the President François Hollande. “The horizon is a long term one, about fifteen years” with a strategic revision every five years. President Emmanuel Macron did a Strategic Review on 2017. It is then a matter of returning to the field and observing public actions. What are their trends and effects with regard to defense and security in France African policy? What interactions are there between these and collective security institutions and international security dynamics?

2. Budget rationalisation and security increments institutionalisation

The 2013 White Paper on Defense and National Security was presented as a “clarification of public action coherence” owing to the budgetary constraints that the public authorities had imposed on themselves. It was a reform along the line of efforts to rationalise policy according to criteria pertaining to monetary and financial resources. This boiled down in effect to budgetary increments against a background of economic crisis over several years. In that sense, the reform constituted a “renovation” compared with the secret and very personalised, indeed personified, nature of earlier defense and security agreements. Such secrecy added greatly to mounting criticism of françafrique.

Unlike an interpersonal practice, it was an institutionalised “defense strategy” that was presented in coordination with the overall national defense and security policy and army engagement doctrines. It intends to comply with the EU Defense Ministers decision of in 2010 to practice “Pooling and Sharing”, ie mutually pooling and sharing of capabilities. It was intended to be an integral part of public action and policy as well as the parliamentary validation process. Indeed, it was used to formulate the military planning law (LPM) which sets the operational priorities and major choices concerning equipment and staffing for a period of six years.

A recurring problem makes one cautious about the LPM numbers. In fact, the gap between the actual execution and the planned appropriations can be significant (~ € 2.6 billion in 2002 for example) and this, for several consecutive years. Since 2009, the policy of rationalization of the civil service plans the closure of 80 military units and the suppression of 54 000 jobs out of 320 000. In 2010, France devotes 600 euros / inhabitant of military expenses.

France’s budgetary expenditure for defense in 2012 was 31.4 billion euros against 180.9 for the whole of the European Union and 583 for the United States. An annual amount of 31.4 billion was projected up to 2016, i.e. 190 billion euros up to 2019. 102.7 billion euros was dedicated to equipment between 2014 and 2019, including new cooperation programmes. A budget increase for research and development went up to an annual amount of 730 million euros.

The arbitration of debates on the defense budget took place at the highest level of state at the offices of the President and the Prime Minister. The decision was taken between restrictive budgetary constraints, on the one hand. On the other, there was concern not to lose coherence and credibility in terms of capabilities and action – in order to preserve sovereignty. In May 2014 the Prime Minister announced that the defense budget would be ring-fenced between 2015 and 2019.
The observation of the budgetary evolution of the defense of France in the long term reveals a downward trend for 30 years. Comparing social spending and defense spending, "warfare vs. welfare ", between 1995 and 2010, social spending (social protection and education) is favored. Military spending is the only one to have seen negative annual variations, while social spending has always maintained a positive growth rate. In contrast, it is expected that there will be a decrease of 2.5%, or 73 million euros in Official Development Assistance in 2015, which in turn would decrease by 10% in the 2015-2017 triennial budget compared to 4% for the overall budget. However, a decrease of 2.5%, i.e. 73 million euros, was envisaged for Official Development Assistance in 2015, and would diminish by 10% in the 2015-2017 triennial budget as against 4% for the overall budget.

**DEFENCE AND SECURITY COOPERATION BUDGET**

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<th>Structural cooperation (diplomatic)</th>
<th>60 million euros/year</th>
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<tr>
<td>Operational cooperation</td>
<td>40 million euros/year</td>
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<tr>
<td>Training of African military personnel for AU and UN</td>
<td>12,000 military personnel from 2010-2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bilateral engagements for Africa 2008-2013</td>
<td>10 million euros</td>
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An observation of the reorganisation of the forces reveals decrements and increments in international and multilateral security. These were due to budgetary constraints during the period (unforeseen extra costs). The gradual abolishment of 23,500 posts was scheduled. In 2012 the total number of personnel was 288,066 military and 27,518 volunteers with operational reserve status. In June 2013, French forces deployed outside metropolitan France totalled 20,900 military divided as follows:

- Sovereignty forces in the French overseas departments: 7,400
- Standing out-of-area forces: 4,000 in Senegal, Gabon, Djibouti, Pacific and Indian Ocean maritime zones
- National OPEX: 6,400 in Mali, Chad, DRC, Côte d’Ivoire, Gulf of Guinea, Jordan and Indian Ocean
- Multinational OPEX: 3,100 with NATO (Afghanistan and Kosovo), UN (Lebanon, CAR and others), EU (Gulf of Aden and Mali) as well as other coalitions (Mali, Indian Ocean).

The situation shows the security increments in reforms internationally: the mix of sovereignty forces, standing out-of-area forces and national and multinational OPEX forces stands out clearly compared with the size of standing out-of-area forces in the 20th century. New types of sovereign military intervention appear, and in relation to an overall African policy where national and European interest evolve in a multilateral UN framework, their sovereign powers allow them to avoid confrontations over legitimacy and sovereignty.
The forces in Afghanistan and Kosovo withdrew. The forces of Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire, Operation Serval in Mali and Operation Épervier in Chad were to be phased out ("disappear"). A new set-up for France in Africa was organised in 2015. Licorne made way for the FFCI, French Forces in Côte d’Ivoire. The new mechanism’s mission was to be a reserve of conventional troops with emergency response capacity on the continent. These troops would also serve as logistic support for operations in the Sahel-Sahara strip (BSS) to fight terrorism. Djibouti being the base in the East. Operation Serval is completed in July 2014, the stabilization relay of Mali passes to the African forces MINUSMA. The regional operation Barkhane sets up the regional counter-terrorism mechanism.

Conception: Christiane Rafidinarivo, 2014

**French military presence in Africa and French territories in Indian Ocean**

*Mayotte is claimed by Comoros and France.*
A new sustainable regional organization of the French military presence in BSS is thus reconfigured. It is based on consolidated pre-positioning in Atlantic Africa, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon, supplemented by the Guépard Nouvelle Génération emergency alert system, renovated in 2012. This new regional organisation would include 3,000 men of whom 1,250 would be based in Chad with the staff of the Army, and 1,000 men in Mali, and others in Niger and forces already stationed in Bukina Faso. 350 men would be in Senegal in advanced base, as in Gabon, for for regional cooperation and to provide training for the armies of the ECOVAS countries and Mauritania. It is also about securing the oil Gulf of Guinea where the United Nations alerted on the dangerous recrudescence of maritime piracy in 2013, comparable to previous years in the Indian Ocean. 2,000 men would remain in the Central African Republic in Operation Sangari as support for MINUSCA to ensure the security of the country and are gradually being put in the position of maintaining peace.

France is increasingly cooperative or collaborative internationally in terms of defense and security. But it does not shrink from “deploying its own capabilities”. This was the case in Mali in the fight against terrorism in 2013. There are 4758 French citizens in Mali and a substantial diaspora from Mali in France. The political crises had resulted in the cumulative fragility of the state. Its weakness created an institutional gap leading to a security vacuum. Foreign jihadist groups claiming terrorist affiliations and claiming responsibility for terrorist actions were crossing the Maghreb. Their meeting up with other fighters from internal conflicts in Mali and Libya materialised. In 2011 the MNLA was created by Tuareg fighters in the Libyan army who left Libya after the fall of Gaddafi. Dissident Ansar Eddine in 2012 conquers northern Mali and self-proclaimed it independent. They are defeated by armed groups of foreign Jihadists of the AQIM from which the MUJAO is linked to local traffickers. They carried out a lightning territorial conquest to the detriment of Mali’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Their advance was marked by acts of violence and interdenominational Muslim conflict. It represented a serious threat to the region and the European neighbourhood.

Mali called for help from France. The urgency of the situation triggers the short politico-military decision-making loop specific to France, which resolved to act and successfully deployed Operation Serval. It is supported by its Western allies with a 25% projection and a very important US intelligence support. After UN resolutions, the MISMA (International Mission of Support in Mali under the aegis of the African forces) joins France alongside the Malian army: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Chad, Togo. The additional budget for France from January to the end of May 2013 is estimated at 250 million euros.

With the improved military situation, France called for and supported the organisation of presidential elections aimed at political and institutional consolidation. The Ouagadougou agreements in 2013, by which the Tuaregs renounce independence, open the electoral political path. But the territorial stake remains a subject of tensions, even of fights between organizations holding the North of the country and the central State. The resulting internal political interactions in Mali and the region should not concern the implementation of the action of France African policy. But how is France to carry out its Responsibility to Protect? And how to analyze these tight global local interactions?

Building Malian and regional security capacity to significantly reduce and remove the threats over time remains a challenge that France cannot meet alone. That is why, it impels the cooperation of security and defense with the G5 Sahel since its creation in 2014 between
states threatened by jihadists and with aim of security and development: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritanie and Niger. The device is completed by the Alliance Sahel whose purpose is to finance the development of the region. This defense cooperation is therefore a military cooperation that is part of a broader security cooperation, itself part of a strategic cooperation and development.

A number of problems remain. On the one hand, the joint force does not obtain a mandate from the United Nations Security Council nor the support of Algeria, which did not join the G5S. On the other hand, almost half of the funding is not yet paid by the end of 2018. Moreover, the French operation Barkhane is experiencing difficulties. Following the speech of French President Emmanuel Macron to Chinese President Xi Jinping, China contributes significantly in financing and equipment in early 2019.

The case of the Central African Republic shows that matters are definitely not simple. There too, the state has been weakened cumulatively through interreligious conflict and the collapse of the state in 2014\(^{54}\). The 2008 White Paper on Defense and Security already spoke of CAR as a lawless zone. The Central African Republic in 2014 could fall within the category of “failed state” mentioned by the 2013 White Paper. The press speaks of a “vanished state” (“État disparu”). Large-scale formation of armed militias was taking place and was at the root of the interreligious political clashes between Christians and Muslims. The goal of disarmament pursued by the French Operation Sangaris was very difficult to implement. It is without guarantee of success or sustainability as long as a process of political restructuring of national living together is not implemented. A United Nations mission, MINUSCA, was set up to protect the population. It contributed to strengthening this week and porous link in equatorial Africa, part of a priority area for France.

Another configuration of “coalition of the willing” action appeared in May 2014 in the fight against terrorism in Africa. It blurred the strategic distinction in France’s African policy between North Africa, considered as part of the Mediterranean, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In many respects it clarifies key points of France’s African security policy\(^{55}\) with regard to the 2013 White Paper. According to the information provided, the Algerian army launched its largest offensive in foreign territory undertaken since its independence. This concerned Libya at its borders with Chad and Tunisia. The operation was led against the Al Quaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) terrorist groups: 5,000 men and substantial air power. It was backed by special French forces\(^{56}\), including those stationed in Niger, American forces based in Spain, and Chadian et Libyan forces. These forces provided substantial logistic aid. On 16 January 2013, these groups had taken the Algerian gas site of In Amenas\(^{57}\).

The French sovereignty forces in Reunion and Mayotte "also play a major role in the framework of security and defense cooperation"\(^{58}\). The FAZSOI have trained 1264 foreign soldiers in 2017. 902 of them are from the Indian Ocean Commission member countries, mostly Malagasy. 347 others are from continental Southern Africa. The goal is to improve interoperability between forces and empower partners. There are two priorities: the fight against terrorism and maritime safety. Indeed "the region represents fertile ground for Islamic radicalization. Between the precarious economic and social situation of a large part of the population, porous borders and state corruption, the free movement and settlement of members of terrorist groups seems to have increased during the last decade. Example in Mozambique: 9 terrorist attacks have been reported in the north of the country since Oct. 2017 ".


These sovereignty forces also participate in cooperation for the establishment of a regional maritime security architecture. It is mainly support for CIRFIM, the Madagascar-based Maritime Information Center and CRCO, a Seychelles-based coordination center for combating maritime piracy. "The next action will aim to strengthen maritime cooperation with the IOC countries bordering the Mozambique Channel". It is an area of strategic importance from a commercial, energetic and environmental point of view: 5,000 ships pass through it every year; 15 billion cubic meters of gas were discovered in 2008 and several riparian countries began the exploitation of hydrocarbons such as oil in Kenya with Uganda, gas in Mozambique and Tanzania and heavy oil in Madagascar; it is an area with biodiversity hotspots. The threats are serious and are characterized by risks of transnational porosity: the scourge of narcotraffic essentially in "smack track" by sea from Afghanistan to the islands of the Indian Ocean, Islamic radicalization, terrorism, piracy and natural resources traffic. Added to this is cooperation in crisis management, including political and security crises.

France African policy synergises military, diplomatic and normative action in a context of reducing defense budget and budgetary in-between cooperation. This is done in terms of operations, negotiations or sanctions under international law. It is a new model of regionalism that is implemented through incremental process of military cooperation (training and OPEX), with political cooperation (political mediation and support for elections), strategic cooperation (club diplomacy) and cooperation development (financing). The new incremental line that is thus revealed is part of the increment of France’s international public action marked by multilateralism and multiple bilateralism. France is reinforcing its status and the leadership role that it intends to play: leader of military intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa with great negotiating power, permanent member of the Security Council and driving force of the European Union. Is this incrementing geared towards regaining power?

3. European relations, cooperative increments and new geopolitics

The mission statement of the 2013 White Paper written by François Hollande in 2012 presents two main context aspects: the international relations players on the one hand, and the risks and threats on the other. It is thus expected of the White Paper to take into account the conflict situations and the security vacuum caused by the “political and social revolutions in the Arab world”. Indeed, Gadaffi’s Libya and Ben Ali’s Tunisia, for example, had been the security allies of France and Europe. Negotiations against the migrations, among others, had been concluded in the context of substantive debates on borders, security, sharing of the fruits of growth, unemployment and citizenship reformulating debates on migration and development. The weakening of the states and/or of the political and security situation after the Arab Spring significantly upset the geostrategic situation of the Mediterranean and Africa, particularly with regard to armed conflict and terrorism.

François Hollande also stresses “the questions surrounding European defense”. It turned out in fact that Europe was not in offensive mode either. European multilateral reaction capability and will were limited by intergovernmentalism. Indeed, the operations budget was the responsibility of the participating member states. The context of budgetary restrictions and the “strict control of European public spending” strongly curtailed operational engagements. The CSDP, Common Security and Defense Policy, was hampered by the cost of collective mobilisation that placed a heavy burden on national budgets.
The instruments of permanent structural cooperation provided for in the EU Treaty \(^{59}\) could partially remedy this. They were not actually implemented. Yet, the Mediterranean, like the Sahel and Equatorial Africa, was a common collective priority of both France and the EU. Several issues took on particular, indeed urgent, strategic significance: migrations from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa to France, one of the main European migrant-hosting countries, jihadist recruitments, attacks, new areas of instability.

In addition, another de facto problem arose. This situation reduced the possibility of recourse to the European Union as a source of international legitimacy regarding military and security interventions. From that point of view, does the United Nations tend, today, to be the only purveyor of legitimacy in this regard or of conflict legalisation? The alternative is a coalition of states at the request of one or several of them based on continuing or ad hoc security and defense agreements.

This forms part of the debate on the dynamics of the European Union. François Hollande defines the 2013 White Paper as a “renewed and deeper reflection”. Indeed, the concept of “deeper” focusses on a European debate stretching over several decades \(^{60}\). This is about the proponents of an “enlarged” Europe, today’s Europe of 28, and those of “deeper” ties between strategic partners, which for European France means the Mediterranean and Africa. In terms of security and defense, François Hollande felt in 2013 that it was more important to conduct a renovation in the sense of deepening ties with France’s neighbours in the South while at the same time attending to what was required for the enlargement of Europe.

From an incremental point of view, it was less a matter of the size of the European Union in itself than about the urgency of neighbourhood problems, on the one hand, and France adapting its potential influence to its capabilities, on the other. The philosophy behind the action decided by the 2013 White Paper on Defense and Security was a “policy of mutual dependence with the EU partners”, and the will to achieve an “interdependence that is organised rather than endured”. An analysis of the actions and checks of the CSDP shows that the Europeanisation of France African policy was not intended as a substitute for the pragmatism \(^{61}\) of state action within multiple bilateralism.

The 2013 information report to the National Assembly on revitalising European defense \(^{62}\) stresses that the possibilities of using the Eurocorps, the Franco-German Brigade, battle groups, the NATO-EU partnership and the relaunching of the CSDP in itself were conspicuous by their absence from the 2013 White Paper. But need one recall the difficulties of networked decision making? This once more brought in the dynamics of the EU and the new character that conflicts and crises were displaying. The Ukrainian crisis in 2014 was another case in point. The enlargement of Europe brought Ukraine, a close neighbour of Russia, a member of the United Nations Security Council, nearer. The balances of power are complex. The degree of unpredictability of local/global interaction arising from the growing number of players is important.

The 2013 White Paper and its mission statement focus on “the perception of the emerging states”. If they are “stable and interventionist states, high-growth economies, poor countries and international relations actors” \(^{63}\), many of them have political, economic and security networks in Africa \(^{64}\). This is particularly the case of China and Russia, members of the United Nations Security Council, because of their diaspora. It also concerns links arising from the fight for independence, social struggles, conflicts, transactions and cooperation. Security increments and their interactions are far from being purely government initiatives. They can be introduced by individuals and their influence is not limited by national boundaries. The emerging states and their new power are ever more present in Africa. Are Nigeria or South
Africa also present elsewhere? Is Africa really “the place to be at”? Is it really what the 2013 report to the French Senate says: “Africa is our future”?

South Africa is the only African country belonging to BRICS. From the point of view of the state, this can be seen as a supreme recognition of its economy. It can also be seen as a political dynamic of emerging countries aimed at building state legitimacy or collective legitimacy in public and private international relations. And seeking to increase their security strength? South Africa or India, for example, are candidates for membership of the United Nations Security Council. The 2013 White Paper on Defense and Security cites two African countries as “supports” and “preferred interlocutors”: South Africa and Nigeria. The latter will have a population of 340 million in 2050, i.e. larger than the American population of 315 million: a security risk or a market opportunity? Before then, Africa will have doubled its population to close to 2.4 billion. It will be the second-largest oil producer after the United States with its shale gas. But with what political unity?

A European security and defense mechanism initiated in 2008 by French President Nicolas Sarkozy, in which emerging states participate, is obtaining conclusive results. It is EUNAVFOR’s Operation Atalanta. Somalia has experienced serious food insecurity for two years. It is prey to ethnic and interconfessional political conflicts as well as to separatist dynamics unacknowledged by the international community. Besides, exploitation fishery is practiced illegally at a large scale by the foreign industrial fishery, mainly from Europe or Asia, contributing to famine in Somalia. Maritime piracy has developed rapidly in this context from 2007 in the Indian Ocean and dangerously threatens free circulation from the Gulf of Aden to the Mozambique Channel on one side and to the Persian Gulf on the other. Even ships carrying United Nations food aid to deal with the famine in Somalia were attacked by Somali maritime piracy.

In that zone, through which one third of world maritime traffic passes, attacks, seizures of vessels (including oil tankers) and cargo, hostage taking, and armed clashes are rife, with whole fleets being made up of high-jacked vessels. In order to fight this barrier to international trade, the international private sector is responding by means of embarked security forces and private intelligence initiatives and is appealing for international public aid. Somalia’s internal conflict is taking on an international dimension.

On land, the situation is much tenser and contributes to the dangerous destabilisation of the Horn of Africa, East Africa and the Indian Ocean, which, together with the Sahel, are priority areas highlighted in the 2013 White Paper on Defense and Security. The porosity between the pirates and the Al-Shabab jihadists linked to Al Qaeda is intensifying. The military operations of the AU’s AMISOM with the backing of the US Africa Command and assistance from the United Nations and the EU are striving to “build peace” and strengthen a fragile state competing for the territory with Al Shabab. It also having to engage with the separatism that has led to the formation of two self-proclaimed independent regions. Now, Puntland is member of Somalia Federation. Somaliland self-independence is not internationally recognized. Neighbouring Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda have soldiers in operation AMISOM on Somalian territory, sparking debates between the responsibility to protect (R2P) and interference, indeed considered as an invasion by Al Shebab.

Attacks, murders and terrorist financing operations are multiplying in Somalia and Kenya, as testified by the Westgate Shopping Centre attack in Nairobi in 2013 and Garrison University in 2016 with Al Shabab claiming responsibility for them. The United Nations have proclaimed official support for Kenya, but the situation has worsened.
SOMALIE: SITUATION ALIMENTAIRE ET DEPLACEMENTS DE POPULATION

SOMALIA: FOOD SITUATION AND MIGRATIONS
SOMALIE : SECURISATION MILITAIRE INTERNATIONALE

DISTRIBUTION MILITAIRE

SOMALILAND
1991

PUNTLAND
1998

ETHIOPIE

DJIBOUTI

SOMALIE

Intervention militaire 2006

bases pirates

Shebab

Intervention militaire 2011

KENYA

AMISOM 2007

Westgate 2013

ATALANTE 2008

Réalisation Thierry Sabatier 2014

SOMALIA: INTERNATIONAL MILITARY SECURITY
In 2016, Al Shabab pledged allegiance to Daesh offering him a territorialized jihadism in competition with Al Qaida in East Africa. In January 2019, it made claimed attacks against Kenya with Al Qaida informations.

The 2008 White Paper said very little about Africa but did in the strategic framework of the “crescent of crisis”\textsuperscript{69}. The definition offered by the French reformulation of the concept is “a unified vision of several arenas (of violent political conflict), under the name of crescent of crisis” (arc de crise)\textsuperscript{70}. In the 2008 White Paper the expression denotes Afghanistan and Pakistan; the extension of the crescent of crisis into the Islamic Maghreb could thus be seen as reaching right down to Mauritania and passing through Mali, the Sahel, Yemen and Somalia. The 2013 White Paper, without reference to the crescent of crisis, speaks of terrorism from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. Could this be out of caution: “By identifying a critical area too precisely, one runs the risk of giving it more reality and substance than it had previously”? Or does it mark a return to an empirical realism when faced with situations of terrorism, security crisis and local conflict? – each of the latter retaining a certain specificity in their interactive ideological, religious, confessional and/or operational network. The dazzling speed of the jihadist advance into Mali is however reminiscent of the exponential expansion of Somalian maritime piracy or the conquests of ISIL\textsuperscript{71} in Iraq. Since 2017, djihadists attacks arise in Northern Mozambique near by gaz mega-projects investments areas.
PIRACY: EFFICIENCY OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY
EU doesn’t have any global naval strategy but international action is being mobilised at the initiative of French president Nicolas Sarkozy in the European Union with Atalanta operation. European interests are under direct threat. The Indian Ocean is Europe’s maritime access route to Asia. It is an EU border via the European Outermost Regions that are “Indian Ocean France” (French Departments and Territories in the Indian Ocean) – Mayotte and Reunion Island – with very important Exclusive Economic Zones. The defense and security apparatus is legitimized by United Nations and EU resolutions and the application of international law. It works in cooperative security.

The port of Victoria, capital of the Seychelles, is becoming an anti-piracy rallying point. The States of the Indian Ocean Commission, including France by Reunion Island, are setting up fight strategy against maritime piracy and a maritime real-time intelligence platform. The Southwest Indian Ocean Islands are actively involved in security governance cooperation in what has become the unprecedented militarization of the Indian Ocean in response to the object conflict over fisheries resources, maritimized resources and high sea freedom of navigation.

This has triggered an unprecedented multi-actors and multi-levels cooperation of many security actors such as this Atalanta operation of the European Union, the NATO Task Force Ocean Shield, the national navies, the private security forces onboard on ships, and the maritime offices of the Chambers of Commerce as well as of the United Nations. The African Union is creating an Indian Ocean Standby Force special anti-piracy under the FAA. Many national and regional marines, naval units, coastguards and public and private embarked forces participate in the maritime security corridor set up from the Gulf of Suez to the Gulf of Aden and right down to the Mozambican Channel by Operation Atalanta and EUNAVFOR’s multinational fleet, which is relayed as far as the Gulf of Oman. NATO operates synergistically within the zone. South Africa has a vessel that patrols the Mozambican channel.

This has led to a new incremental form of militarization of the region. This is an opportunity for Russia to train its fleet, for Iran to obtain the authorization to use the Suez Canal after long years of being banned from it, for India to mobilize its strategic maritime partnership ALINDIEN with France and Europe or for China to cross far from its territory in an operation to protect world trade. By now, Chinese and Russian’s navals are very present in Indian Ocean. In addition, China develops its maritime Silk Belt and Road Initiative through Indian Ocean to Africa and Russia becomes more present since its role in Syria conflict. The lobbies of the private security companies in network with the private companies concerned are putting active pressure on the state networks to obtain the markets of security of the Indian Ocean maritime transport. New geopolitics is merging.

The question of the disputed exploitation of Somali fishery resources and its issues is causing a serious threat to the Southwest Indian Ocean Islands. In this context and the serious matter of maritime piracy and its porosity with traffics and terrorism, island states build new cooperation as a response to new threats and risks. They did it in partnership with Indian Ocean Commission that is the only African islands cooperation organisation. Seychelles, for example, for which the direct threat against fishing and tourism is a matter of survival, set up Operation Thazard with its coastguard. It welcoming NATO forces to its soil until 2016, working with EUNAVFOR European Operation Atalanta, and offers port facilities to all forces engaged in the fight against maritime piracy. These facilities are initiated by the IOC Anti-Piracy Unit within the framework of the Maritime Security Program (MASE) and host
the Regional Operational Coordination Center (CRCO). This unit applies judicial extraterritoriality, and judges and incarcerates Somali pirates on her soil. New international norms have been obtained. Legislation on the internationalization of the judicialization of acts of piracy and the legalization of the "reverse" prosecution, that is in territorial waters and on the territory of Somalia in order to pursue and detain persons suspected of piracy. It is put in place from the UN Security Council Resolution 2015 in 2011. Madagascar becomes the headquarters of the Regional Maritime Information Fusion Center (CRFIM) on Piracy in the South West Indian Ocean with the support of the French FAZSOI based in La Reunion. It is the Armed Forces of the South-West Indian Ocean Zone, also in charge of the command of the Mayotte-based Corps of Legionaries. FAZSOI’s area of responsibility covers the maritime zones of thirteen countries contiguous to that of the Djibouti base in the North in the Gulf of Aden which is adjacent to ALINDIEN, French naval forces based in Abu Dhabi.74

There is a double democratized institutionalization process within: ad hoc and structural. This is done on an ad hoc basis as in the fight against maritime piracy, initially inspired by what succeeded at the end of the 20th century in the East of the Indian Ocean in the Straits of Malacca. The International Contact Group on Piracy off Somalia, GCPCS, for example, was established following United Nations Security Council Resolution 1851 in 2008. The GCPCS acts by delegation of the United Nations. It has about sixty member States and is chaired in 2018 by Mauritius. Common and cooperative security can also be observed structurally in the development of peace and security councils of regional organizations such as the African Union, the Southern African Development Community, the IOC or the Indian Ocean Rim Association, for example.75 This is also the case of their stabilization efforts in the face of political and diplomatic crisis in Madagascar or Comoros over the last ten years following the subsidiarity principle of United Nations. “In fact, the network of interdependence in which their security is anchored is significantly mediated by the effects of geography: all things being equal, it is in its neighbors, with whom it shares a history, that a State first sees a threat - or not - to its security," thus favoring "pacified regional security complexes"76 and networked security communities.

We have seen how cooperation is used by the Southern Indian Ocean Islands as a response to conflicts of sovereignty (as maritime territory) and / or object (as fishery or transport). We have observed how this cooperation evolves from inter-state cooperation towards greater multi-stakeholder and multi-levels complexity. We have noted that their sovereign cooperation has widened in relation to the governance of an increasingly associative regional cooperation.77 It thus responds internationally to armed and other than military threats in a state and societal way. The realism of the concept of security often expands in their international cooperation in security governance developing a common and cooperative security78 while in search of development and stability, which are not so easy to find. These multi-stakeholders and multi-levels collaborations reveal a new insular dimension to explore, that of Michel Foucault’s idea of “governmentality”79. Indeed, the islands become also defined by all the totality of their strategic positions, their governmentality, in a world where local and global regionalization and globalization interact. More than that, they reveal new multi-track practices of the strategic and operational dialogue in cooperation as well as of security building as a collective action, even of common good, with regional and global scope. French President Emmanuel Macron said in 2018: “Islands in the world become unique contemporary geopolitical actors.”80,
4. Discussions on incrementing burden-sharing

Burden sharing to facing violent political conflict has increment reform debates and issues. François Hollande contextualises the 2013 White Paper on Defense and Security with regard to the “inflections of the United States’ foreign policies”. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, the United States ended up as a unipolar power and engaged in a multilateralism which it largely drove and financed. Some speak of a “subservient multilateralism”81. This is however limited by the paradox of a dynamic foreign policy in this regard and several no parliamentary ratifications. These are ascribed to traditional American isolationism and/or to posturing as a unilateral power. But de facto, the United States remains the leader of the burden-sharing of collective security in the world.

The failure of the UN operation in Somalia in 1992-1993 on the one hand, and then the September 11 attacks in 2001 on the other, are considered as the return of the United States to a selective multilateral policy centred on the Security Council or club diplomacy (from the G7 to the G20) as well as to interventionism favouring “coalitions of the willing”. When it comes to action, however, the Republicans have a more unilateralist approach and the Democrats a more multilateralist one.

The 2008 report to the French Senate82 emphasizes “the greater involvement of the United States in Africa” through several anti-terrorism military assistance programmes: in the Sahara, the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP); in East Africa, the East African Counterterrorism Program; in Djibouti where the forces of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa are based (the only permanent US military base in Africa) for the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean.

The 2008 report highlights the United States' concern to secure their energy supply from Africa, and in particular from Atlantic Africa. They are making efforts to preserve international shipping routes. They want to protect their nationals, their investments and privileged trade flows between certain African countries and the United States, stemming from the African Growth Opportunity Act. They are willing to partner against radical Islamism. The report acts "the return of the United States to Africa". The first US-Africa83 summit is held in Washington DC, in 2014. The highlights are development of trade and investment, security and African international relations with China.

Because the United States has failed to establish, as planned, US Africom in continental Africa, their military presence in Africa relies heavily on advice, support and training. But it is also a deployment using the European "neighborhood". The United States has the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean as part of an agreement with Great Britain of which it is an overseas territory. In 2007 US Africom was established, a US integrated command for Africa is based in Germany. It is aimed at conflict prevention, peace keeping and humanitarian aid. It has response capability as a forward base in Djibouti. The coalition operation in Libya against terrorist groups in 2014 resorted to US special forces stationed in Spain.

The 2013 White Paper on Defense and National Security mentions something else: new conceptions of the distribution of security responsibility areas in the world. As de facto “global policeman”, the United States claims to be the “guarantor of world order”. It attaches high democratic values to this claim as well as the protection and promotion of its societal model. Along with Canada, it would expect greater accountability from the Europeans for their own security and defense in Europe, the Mediterranean and Africa84.
On the French side, in the face of terrorist threats and acts, terrorism is no longer relegated to the rank of American problem or pretext. It is henceforth treated as a collective security problem concerning international public action and policy. Transatlantic ties have been tightened by keeping France in NATO’s integrated command: no empty security chair as de Gaulle’s practice. The issue of the telephones of European leaders and European Union leaders being tapped by the US secret services shows that alliances and coalitions are complex matters. However, alliances against terrorism is tightened after Paris attacks on 2015 and the emergency state law applied until 2017 in France including overseas territories as in East Africa neighbourhood in Indian Ocean.

President Barack Obama’s speech at West Point on 28 May 2014 on American leadership no doubt elucidates what François Hollande calls the “inflections of US foreign policy”, during two presidential terms. Scott Wilson, a Washington Post press correspondent at the White House considers that the West Point speech advocates a vision of US foreign policy that President Obama has had throughout his political career. He points out the contradiction between the focus on the situation in Syria and the decision not to act. This was before the territorial seizures by the Sunni radical jihadist movement ISIL in Iraq which also fought in Syria and has extended influence there.

Barack Obama states “Our army has no equal”, but... “that does not mean that every problem has a military solution... Having the best hammer does not mean that every problem is a nail”. Military action can by no means be the only component of leadership. On the other hand, the United States is, according to him, “from Europe to Asia, the hub of alliances unrivalled in the history of nations... In the 21st century, American isolationism is not an option”. The beginning of the speech on world leadership: “If we don’t, no one else will” puts into perspective the explicit “inflection” of renewed “interest” in this for Europe.

The two options that he presents are, on the one hand, a unilateralism of force: “America should never ask permission to protect our people, our homeland, or our way of life” and, on the other, when there is no direct threat, recourse to mobilisation of “allies and partners to take collective action”: diplomacy, development, sanctions, isolation, recourse to international law, multilateral military action. With regard to terrorism and the ubiquitous threat thereof, partnerships should be cultivated with countries where terrorist networks have taken root and partners should be empowered. Therefore no “protectorates”.

To fight terrorism, Barack Obama announced to Congress a request for a fund of 5 billion dollars for:
- Training security forces in Yemen fighting Al Qaeda
- Support for a multilateral peace-keeping force in Somalia with European allies
- Border control security in Libya and for French facilitation of operations in Mali.

He stresses the need to seek political solutions and to ensure a sufficient flow of information to shape global opinion in order to obtain international legitimacy. Institutions need to be strengthened through coalitions, international law and agreements that must be confirmed through action. The conflict in Yemen becomes a civil war where intervenes a military coalition lead by Saudi Arabia. The issue of the war is the most humanitarian disaster ever seen.

African American politics in network with Europe and France, however, is not only anti-terrorist. In his Independence Day 2014 speech, the US Representative in Madagascar, Eric Wong for example, announces the re-engagement of his country with the Malagasy Armed
Forces as part of the lifting of the sanctions. The purpose of the bilateral security program is to build the capacity of national security forces. It is not only a question of securing the coastal borders of Madagascar, but also of contributing effectively to the multilateral maintenance of peace in the region. It is a means of regulating a weak link in securing East Africa and global security reconfiguration in Africa as well as interactions of partner-adversaries of the bilateral competitions, in this case the United States and France in the case of Madagascar since the political crisis of 2009.

At West-Point, President Barack Obama states that he intends to respect human rights, empower civil society and form alliances with governments and ordinary individuals. Barack Obama advocates American fiscal leadership. This will enable his allies – here the Europeans and France are named explicitly – to back policies that will ring-fence their defense budgets in order to fight terrorism under an Atlantic-Mediterranean-Indian Ocean geostrategy. In fact, there is an overall local reorganization of the security burden-sharing.

At the end of World War II, the protection of the Western world is assured by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization with US leadership. Following the enlargement of NATO after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there are today 28 members. The transatlantic debate on burden-sharing focuses on the unequal sharing of risks and costs by a multi-speed Alliance, which is also found in other organizations. President Donald Trump has discussed this debate wide and large. The share of the United States in NATO spending goes from 50% to 75% and they point to what they say is the refusal of many members to allocate budgets to reforms necessary for their own defense. However, for President Trump, Europeans are not to have an autonomous NATO army.

The debate on burden sharing goes far beyond NATO on the one hand and the military field on the other. It concerns more than "security" with the "enlarged security" and its process of "securitization". Security alliances form different degrees of epistemic and security community integration. The actions of institutional or ad hoc international organizations, whether public or private, generate their own culture of burden sharing. If one starts from the conception and the practices of this type of alliance that international security is a collective good, it is necessary for them to agree, not only on the cost, but on its definition, its value and the benefits that can be removed. Is security only military? Is not it also food-related, human, environmental for example? How are decisions made? Who's deciding? Who ultimately decides and on what criteria? Who holds the epistemic power?

The French experiences of the reorganization of burden sharing in their African policy have found evolutionary answers to these questions because of the evolution of the risks and threats on the one hand, but also the limits and the gaps of the answers brought on the other hand, included in the budget. This was the case for the different applied models of networks of cooperation generally with OPEX: Recamp, African Forces in Waiting, Joint Forces, UN forces, coalitions, alliances. They are structured in a network at multiple scales: local, regional, international, power, thematic or ad hoc. These models are progressively articulated with anti-crime mechanisms such as drug trafficking or money laundering, support for electoral processes to consolidate legitimization processes and development cooperation in the medium and long term in order to better share even unload, the security burden.

In these interactions how can we evaluate, compare and weigh not only budgetary contributions but also negotiations, mediations, international collective mobilization, networks? Even in military operations, the burden-sharing presents very varied forms
according to the possibilities and the institutional, political, material and circumstantial constraints of each one. Does the discussion concern everyone according to his/her duty or to each according to his/her abilities or his/her interests?

The parliamentary report on Operation Serval, for example, draws up a list of international contributions, specifying those that are paid for, others free, without mentioning the reasons and others free "in solidarity with France". Another very different example in memorial politics: in his speech commemorating the landing of Provence in 2014, François Hollande invites many African heads of state and government on the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. Positioning himself as a leader ally with the Africans, he declares with respect to their nations the political debt of France due in solidarity security.

Leadership and power in security burden sharing are also heavily criticized in terms of the balance of power, both internally and by opponents: domination, hegemony, colonization, neo-colonialism, unilateralism, asymmetry, and dissymmetry. The analysis of these interactions is to put into perspective the multiple dimensions and levels of relations, affiliations and international contributions of actors: UN organizations, regional, multilateral, multinational, bilateral, thematic, ad hoc. Defense security is a field of sovereignty and these debates shape the possibilities and limits of cooperation in this area.

What about public-private burden sharing? Realists consider that international security concerns threats to the state. The theoretical debates bring two other dimensions of the threats made to the private sector: the threats against the person on the one hand and the corporations on the other hand. States consider that it is their responsibility to protect only the safety of their nationals and their interests. In addition, the privatization of international security has important implications for overall security governance on one side and multiple levels on the other. They are complex and opaque.

The case of the fight against piracy in the Indian Ocean raises, for example, the thorny question of the legitimacy and the legality of the use of private force as well as its intensity and its militarization. Since the state no longer has the monopoly of force, the disconnection between the population and the weapons holders is established, which constitutes a democratic deficit. Another dimension of the problem, for what is happening in international waters, is who has the responsibility to protect whom? What about the hostages? The security policies of private companies are inevitable with their governance if the institutions do not legislate and do not control and if the public space does not allow debate.

The influence of information is considerable and informative burden sharing is of strategic importance. What is its influence on abrupt changes, especially for budget developments? Most of the maritime information on piracy, for example, comes from the private organization of the International Maritime Bureau by the chambers of commerce. In the Indian Ocean, an intelligence platform has been set up with other public and private actors. The Summit of Heads of State of the Indian Ocean Commission, welcoming its actions, also highlights the flaws in 2014. The French President François Hollande announces the creation of a center that will merge maritime intelligence. IOC thus supports the creation of the Madagascar-based CRFIM and the Seychelles CRCO with FAZSOI support to reduce information asymmetry and improve the interoperability of forces. The IOC is the only African organization of which France is a member, in respect of the territories of Reunion and Mayotte, overseas France and the outermost European regions.
In general, it is necessary to analyze the interactions between the information asymmetry and its impact in the alliance and confrontational power relations between the actors. In this respect, security issues emerge more or less easily and/or very asymmetrically depending on the companies in cooperation. How do security issues and defense issues get introduced into the public debate? Which ones are answered by political actors or political institutions? Asymmetry is not only about access to information. It also consists of its content as well as the way different scales of public, local, national, regional, and international spaces, might provoke discussions and political mobilization that might in turn lead to the issue to be listed on the security agenda and the public and private action.

However, it is necessary to consider in the discussion that African politics as a component of the sovereign foreign policies of states interacting with other actors has a dual dimension of sharing and competing. Since globalization, areas of influence in Africa, including security, are no longer strictly those of former colonial powers. New public and private actors invite themselves to the international security game in Africa. There are Africans themselves by their sovereign and regional policies. There is the legacy of the cold war, the new African policy of the US, that of Europe and Europeans and the rise of the emerging ones. France's African policy is facing a change of scale from that of its partners and competitors as well as from sources of risks and threats: that of regionalization in globalization.

It is in the maritimization that one observes one of the most recent and most structuring changes in this field. We have seen it in the field of hydrocarbon resources, fisheries or piracy and high water circulation issues. However, 93% of world trade is by sea. Its security is a major issue in the global competition in which the United States and the major powers traditionally assert themselves. For example, 2015 US report on its naval cooperative strategy asserts that “U.S. naval forces will contribute to the long-term security of the global economic system”. Great Britain announces the strengthening of its naval capabilities in its national security strategy and strategic review of 2015. The same year, all emerging countries, including South Africa and except Brazil, publish a document on their naval strategy. In 2016, Admiral Rogel recalls that "In Europe, France is today the only navy with the full range of naval capabilities."

Everyone knows that naval strategies and investments are sustainable. China is now one of the first naval powers in the world. Its maritime power has become global with an unrivaled network of commercial and security harbor investments. From 2015 its new cooperation platform Silk Belt and Road Initiative combines a trajectory of land and sea investments that relies on its financial strength. President Emmanuel Macron said in 2018 that “China has posed one of the most important geopolitical concepts recent decades with its new Silk Road.” On the other hand, China loosens the grip of maritime passages and its allied neighbors in the United States by asserting itself in the South China Sea as in an inland sea. For this purpose, it relies on islands with territorial disputes without internationally recognized maritime boundaries. China has become Africa's first partner focused on natural resources, FDI and global transportation. In 2018, the White House announces the creation by the President Donald Trump of a new Africa strategy: "Prosper Africa". President Trump's National Security Advisor explains that this contributes to the challenge of China and Russia.
# BRICS NAVAL STRATEGY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Maritime Zone</th>
<th>South Africa</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>Brazil</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 756 575 km²</td>
<td>887 000 km² (3 000 000 km² with claimed territories)</td>
<td>2 300 000 km²</td>
<td>7 600 000 km² (+ previous widening 1 000 000 km²)</td>
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| Naval Doctrines/Strategies | Trade State Continental and regional defense Maritime regionalism | (No First Use policy), Pearl necklace, widening of its zone of influence in 3 progressive stages until 2040, time of modernization of the fleet One belt, one road | (No First Use policy), Look East Policy, modernization of the fleet Indo-Pacific security and stability | NFU, Arctic strategy to restore a Russian naval presence in strategic corners of the world, importance of a strategy for the management and protection of natural resources | Green and Blue Amazonia Modernization and militarization of the Brazilian army, recess of the military presence in the Amazon |

| Previsional naval budget growth 2011-2016 | 10% (2017-2018 / 2018-2019) | 57% | 69% | 35% | 65% |

INTERNATIONAL TERRITORY CONTESTATIONS AND MARITIMIZATION CONFLICT - 2018
The 2018 report of the French Senate on the Silk Roads recommends the participation of France, preferably by joining forces with the European Union. The provisional budget program for the 2019 external action of the State established by the Ministry of European and Foreign Affairs of France stipulates as regards "to strengthen the international security and the safety of the French" that "More generally: in the context an ever stronger presence of Africa's new partners, first of all China, with regard to our renewed relationship with our African neighbor, followed by the progressive implementation of the thirty or so commitments contained in the speech of the President of the Republic delivered in Ouagadougou on November 29, 2017, including, the necessary boosting of our exchanges with Anglophone and Lusophone Africa and, by 2020, the preparation of the Africa - France Summit, which will be placed under the theme of the Sustainable City as well as the Season of African Cultures for sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian Ocean.

The Preface by President Emmanuel Macron of the 2017 Strategic Review and his presentation speech at Assises des Outre-Mers in 2018 reaffirms the strategic importance of the Oceans for France, as well as the islands. It is the second largest maritime power in terms of its overseas territories without having a truly global maritime strategy to date. President Macron recalls that India is France's main strategic ally in the region. He also announces the insertion of France in the Indo-Pacific design led by the United States with Australia, India and its allies in the two oceans. He puts on the agenda the decision process for investment in a new aircraft carrier. Is this a turning point in France African security policy characterized by an articulation of incremental reforms with a global strategy?

CONCLUSION

Gaullist France African policy and its security cooperation was one of “greatness”. France may justify and assert its position in the United Nations Security Council, its European leadership and exert an international political influence globally with it. They are specific support to protect and making flourish its strategic and economic interests. The second generation of this cooperation searched to mutualise military and budget according the principle of burden sharing. The proceeding is training and implementation of multilateral architecture of regional African defense and security. Budget equation has’t been solved and realisations were limited. In peace time, sovereignty gain often involves “low-cost” cooperation. However, responding to common risks and threats may mobilize forces and international funding (as for fight against maritime piracy since 2008 or for G5 Sahel in 2018 and 2019) in a new multilateralism.

However, whatever the majority in power in France, in case of crisis or armed conflict in Africa, it intervenes in its zone of influence by military commitment. From now on, it ensures the international legitimacy of Africa. This is done in both ways, with “France’s own capacity” as in Mali in 2013 and in the Central African Republic in 2014; or in coalition as in Libya in 2014. It is clear that two types of mechanisms coexist in second generation cooperation: security cooperation on the conventional intergovernmental format and cooperative security on a multi-stakeholder, multiple scale network format. In each format, there are two different proceedings: structural or ad hoc.

This is a “pragmatism” or “new realism” was approved by French opinion leaders even though by those critical of France African policy. It was also approved by French public opinion, although it was very critical of President François Hollande’s domestic and European
policies; as well as by the majority of the African diaspora. These military interventions in Africa, however, only partially address what France's African policy could bring to the security and possible prosperity of the French and Africans.

The 2013 Defense and Security White Paper bases this policy mainly on the rationalization of its African policy in public action and policy by means of security increments. This reform is done by incremental process. It was implemented little by little through spontaneous increments and/or by political will. Budget, funding and networking are key instruments of this process. It is a corollary to the dynamism of other actors and the decline of France’s power in Africa. France’s security and defense actions in Africa, borne by military action, are once more becoming factors of political power: “the capacity and will to act or not act, but also to get the other to act or to prevent him from doing so” 103. It became an influential policy in a globalised and competitive world.

The same may be said of those who have benefitted from military and political interaction. The weakness of their capabilities having resulted in a collective risk, they find themselves in a position now to “get the other to act or to prevent him from acting”. Foreign security and defense actions can therefore be factors of political power both for the “protector” and the “protected”; and both for those delivering the intervention and those requesting it. Disymmetric interaction can be transformed into a “protectorate” or into manipulation – both domestically and on the international scene – by the beneficiary. What constructive political interactions will Africa and France succeed in incrementing?

In consolidating states in this way, France runs the risk of bolstering leaders and regimes which, on the one hand, will not be true allies, have little or no other sources of political legitimacy and/or repress their opponents and the population. Security cooperation as well as cooperative security under such conditions are likely to become factors of repression on the one hand, and of impoverishment on the other. However, in not consolidating states in this way, France risks endangering its own security in the transnational dynamics of crises, terrorism and the internationalisation of local conflict. These problems relating to security and political interactions have arisen in Africa in the Malian or CAR crises but also in Ukraine, Egypt, Syria or Iraq, for example. What can be done to ensure that France’s public policies do not create insecurity in Africa and that those of African countries do not create insecurity in France? What inclusive dynamics can France and Africa implement to ensure that the policy regulates the violence?

France’s political will to commit to resolving crises in the world is manifest in its political action and its coherent alignment of public action and public policy. One of the main concerns is budgetary. It is the reduction of the defense budget on the one hand and the even greater reduction of official development aid on the other hand: from 0.43 to 0.41% of GDP. This choice is determined by a foreign policy mix which reduces the means to remedy security and humanitarian crises in time. The other concern is that the urgency and pressure of meeting security does not preclude questioning the real public policy problems adapted to the realities of change in Africa.

Has France’s African policy and its security cooperation broken with the “francophone pre-square”? Not once does the word francophone appear in the 2013 Defense and Security White Paper. At the 2014 Indian Ocean Commission Summit, President François Hollande declares that “the Francophonie is not the influence of France but of the culture you have chosen to share with us.” 104. How will such institutional pragmatism and governance of international relations interact? Is this the formula of a new institutionalism?
From President Nicolas Sarkozy to President François Hollande and then President Emmanuel Macron, it is in any case a reform of sort by “renovators”, also called “moderns”, as opposed to conservatives or “ancients”. It is not necessarily about a political divide (left/right), nor an ideological one (progressive/liberal), nor one where reformers oppose defenders of the status quo, neither French nor Africans, neither Francophones nor Anglophones, neither great powers nor emerging but rather it is a dynamic approach between renovators and conservatives from different ways. Last decade, new geopolitics is merging as results of new ways of trade, invest, war and cooperation. African security policies are building response to risks, threats and opportunities in a new open world game.
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OPEX: External operations conducted outside the French national territory and in collaboration with local armies, they are then called national or with international organizations and they are called multinational, not to be confused with multinational companies. Source: French Ministry of Defense

ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States


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Mouvement pour l’Unicité et le Jihad en Afrique


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