J. De-borda, C (1781) Mémoire sur lesélections au scrutin. Histoire de l'académie royale des sciences, pp.657-665

W. Bruns and B. Ichim, Normaliz, algorithms for affine monoids and rational cones, Journal of Algebra, vol.324, issue.5, pp.1098-1113, 2010.

W. Bruns, B. Ichim, T. Romer, R. Sieg, and C. Soger, Normaliz: Algorithms for rational cones and affine monoids, 2017.

W. Bruns, B. Ichim, and C. Soger, Computations of volumes and Ehrhart series in four candidates elections, Forthcoming in Annals of Operations Research, 2019.

D. Bubboloni, M. Diss, and M. Gori, Extensions of the Simpson voting rule to the committee selection setting, 2019.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01827668

D. P. Cervone, W. V. Gehrlein, and W. S. Zwicker, Which scoring rule maximizes Condorcet efficiency under IAC?, Theory and Decision, vol.2, issue.58, pp.145-185, 2005.

M. Condorcet and . De, Essai sur l'application de l'analyseà la probabilité des décisions renduesà la pluralité des voix, 1785.

S. Courtin, M. Martin, and I. Moyouwou, The q-majority efficiency of positional rules, Theory and Decision, vol.1, issue.79, pp.31-49, 2015.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00914907

S. Courtin, M. Martin, and B. Tchantcho, Positional rules and qCondorcet consistency, Review of Economic Design, vol.3, issue.19, pp.229-245, 2015.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00914900

M. Diss and A. Doghmi, Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes, Public Choice, vol.169, pp.97-116, 2016.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01285526

M. Diss, E. Kamwa, and A. Tlidi, A note on the likelihood of the absolute majority paradoxes, Economics Bulletin, vol.38, issue.4, pp.1727-1734, 2018.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01896273

M. Diss and W. V. Gehrlein, The true impact of voting rule selection on Condorcet efficiency, Economics Bulletin, vol.35, issue.4, pp.2418-2426, 2015.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01231013

M. Diss and W. V. Gehrlein, Borda's paradox with weighted scoring rules, Social Choice and Welfare, vol.38, pp.121-136, 2012.

M. Diss, V. Merlin, and F. Valognes, On the Condorcet efficiency of approval voting and extended scoring rules for three alternatives, Handbook on approval voting, pp.255-283, 2010.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00533124

M. Franz, Convex -a maple package for convex geometry, 2017.

W. V. Gehrlein, Condorcet's paradox, Theory and Decision, vol.2, issue.15, pp.161-197, 1983.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01452557

W. V. Gehrlein, Condorcet's paradox, 2006.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01452557

W. V. Gehrlein and P. C. Fishburn, Condorcet's paradox and anonymous preference profiles, Public Choice, vol.1, issue.26, pp.1-18, 1976.

W. V. Gehrlein and P. C. Fishburn, The effects of abstentions on election outcomes, Public Choice, vol.2, issue.33, pp.69-82, 1978.

W. V. Gehrlein and P. C. Fishburn, Effects of abstentions on voting procedures in three-candidate elections, Behavioral Science, vol.5, issue.24, pp.346-354, 1979.

W. V. Gehrlein and D. Lepelley, Voting paradoxes and group coherence: the Condorcet efficiency of voting rules, 2011.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01243452

W. V. Gehrlein and D. Lepelley, The Condorcet efficiency advantage that voter indifference gives to approval voting over some other voting rules, Group Decision and Negotiation, vol.2, issue.24, pp.243-269, 2015.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01450834

W. V. Gehrlein and D. Lepelley, Elections, voting rules and paradoxical outcomes, 2017.

W. V. Gehrlein and D. Lepelley, Analyzing the probability of election outcomes with abstentions, Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, 2019.

W. V. Gehrlein and F. Valognes, Condorcet efficiency: A preference for indifference, Social Choice and Welfare, vol.1, issue.18, pp.193-205, 2001.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02173169

E. Kamwa, On the likelihood of the Borda effect: the overall probabilities for general weighted scoring rules and scoring runoff rules, Group Decision and Negotiation, vol.28, issue.3, pp.519-541, 2019.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01786590

E. Kamwa, Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser. Forthcoming in Theory and Decision, 2019.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01786121

E. Kamwa and I. Moyouwou, Susceptibility to manipulation by sincere truncation: the case of scoring rules and scoring runoff systems, Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, Essays by and in honor of William Gehrlein and Dominique Lepelley. Diss, M. and Merlin, 2019.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02185965

D. Lepelley, A. El-ouafdi, and H. Smaoui, Probabilities of electoral outcomes in four-candidate elections, 2018.

D. Lepelley, I. Moyouwou, and H. Smaoui, Monotonicity paradoxes in three-candidate elections using scoring elimination rules, Social Choice and Welfare, vol.50, issue.1, pp.1-33, 2018.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01697627

D. Lepelley, A. Louichi, and H. Smaoui, On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory, Social Choice and Welfare, vol.30, issue.3, pp.363-383, 2008.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01245310

D. Lepelley, P. Pierron, and F. Valognes, Scoring rules, Condorcet efficiency, and social homogeneity, Theory and Decision, vol.49, pp.175-196, 2000.

D. Lepelley and H. Smaoui, Comparing two ways for eliminating candidates in three-alternative elections using sequential scoring rules, Group Decision and Negotiation, vol.28, issue.4, pp.787-804, 2019.

V. Merlin and F. Valognes, The impact of indifferent voters on the likelihood of some voting paradoxes, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol.3, issue.48, pp.343-361, 2004.
URL : https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00069089

I. Moyouwou and H. Tchantcho, Asymptotic vulnerability of positional voting rules to coalitional manipulation, Mathematical Social Sciences, vol.89, pp.70-82, 2017.