Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy - Université de La Réunion Access content directly
Journal Articles Journal of Economics Year : 2015

Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy

Abstract

This paper develops a theory of the centralization of firms engaged in multi-market collusive agreements. A centralized organization (called the unitary or U-form) allows price coordination across several markets, whereas with decentralized (the multidivisional or M-form) firms the probability that the antitrust authority will find evidence of collusion on one market while investigating the other is lower. We show that the firm’s choice of internal structure depends to a large extent on product substitutability and the instruments used by the antitrust authority.
No file

Dates and versions

hal-01450833 , version 1 (31-01-2017)

Identifiers

Cite

Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques. Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy. Journal of Economics, 2015, 114 (2), pp.153-176. ⟨10.1007/s00712-013-0386-9⟩. ⟨hal-01450833⟩
247 View
0 Download

Altmetric

Share

Gmail Mastodon Facebook X LinkedIn More