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Technologies flexibles et collusion tacite

Abstract : The aim of this paper is to study the links between flexibility technological choices and tacit collusion in a duopoly. We prove that adoption of flexible technologies improves tacit collusion, when competition is à la Bertrand, but makes it more difficult, when competition is à la Cournot. We characterize the technological equilibria in this repeated game framework. We show that semi-collusion improves the adoption of flexible technologies.
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Armel Jacques. Technologies flexibles et collusion tacite. Recherches Economiques de Louvain - Louvain economic review, De Boeck Université, 2006, 72 (4), pp.385-413. ⟨10.3917/rel.724.0385⟩. ⟨hal-01300695⟩

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