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A note on Condorcet's other paradox

William V. Gehrlein 1 Dominique Lepelley 2
1 University of Delaware [Newark]
2 CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien
Abstract : We report in this note some results on the theoretical likelihood of Condorcet's Other Paradox in three alternative elections. This paradox occurs when we have a voting situation such that no Wheighted Scoring Rule (WSR) will select the Pairwise Majority Rule Winner as the WSR winner. We conclude from our study that actual observances of Condorcet's Other Paradox should be very rare events.
Keywords : Majority rule Probability Revue AERES Scoring rules Social Choice Voting paradoxes
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Submitted on : Tuesday, December 15, 2015 - 7:37:59 AM
Last modification on : Tuesday, October 19, 2021 - 5:56:06 PM

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William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley. A note on Condorcet's other paradox. Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, 2009, 29 (3), pp.2000--2007. ⟨hal-01243468⟩

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