A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser

Abstract : Analytical representations are developed for the probability that Approval Voting (AV) elects the Condorcet Loser in three-alternative elections with large electorates. A comparison of AV is then made to Plurality Rule (PR) to show that AV is much less susceptible to the risk of electing the Condorcet loser than PR. All calculations in this analysis are based on IAC-like assumptions.
Keywords : Economics
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2016, 80, pp.115--122. 〈10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.009〉
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http://hal.univ-reunion.fr/hal-01452548
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Soumis le : jeudi 2 février 2017 - 06:36:59
Dernière modification le : dimanche 5 novembre 2017 - 15:58:04

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William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley, Issofa Moyouwou. A note on Approval Voting and electing the Condorcet loser. Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2016, 80, pp.115--122. 〈10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.02.009〉. 〈hal-01452548〉

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