Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy

Abstract : This paper develops a theory of the centralization of firms engaged in multi-market collusive agreements. A centralized organization (called the unitary or U-form) allows price coordination across several markets, whereas with decentralized (the multidivisional or M-form) firms the probability that the antitrust authority will find evidence of collusion on one market while investigating the other is lower. We show that the firm’s choice of internal structure depends to a large extent on product substitutability and the instruments used by the antitrust authority.
Type de document :
Article dans une revue
Journal of Economics, 2014, 114 (2), pp.153--176. 〈10.1007/s00712-013-0386-9〉
Liste complète des métadonnées

http://hal.univ-reunion.fr/hal-01450833
Contributeur : Réunion Univ <>
Soumis le : mardi 31 janvier 2017 - 13:57:52
Dernière modification le : mardi 16 janvier 2018 - 14:42:54

Identifiants

Citation

Emilie Dargaud, Armel Jacques. Hidden collusion by decentralization: firm organization and antitrust policy. Journal of Economics, 2014, 114 (2), pp.153--176. 〈10.1007/s00712-013-0386-9〉. 〈hal-01450833〉

Partager

Métriques

Consultations de la notice

46