A note on Condorcet's other paradox

Abstract : We report in this note some results on the theoretical likelihood of Condorcet's Other Paradox in three alternative elections. This paradox occurs when we have a voting situation such that no Wheighted Scoring Rule (WSR) will select the Pairwise Majority Rule Winner as the WSR winner. We conclude from our study that actual observances of Condorcet's Other Paradox should be very rare events.
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Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, 2009, 29 (3), pp.2000--2007
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Soumis le : mardi 15 décembre 2015 - 07:37:59
Dernière modification le : dimanche 5 novembre 2017 - 15:58:04

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William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley. A note on Condorcet's other paradox. Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, 2009, 29 (3), pp.2000--2007. 〈hal-01243468〉

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