On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games

Abstract : When the number of players is small in a weighted majority voting game, it can occur that one of the players has no influence on the result of the vote, in spite of a strictly positive weight. Such a player is called a “dummy” player in game theory. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the conditions that give rise to such a phenomenon and to compute its likelihood. It is shown that the probability of having a dummy player is surprisingly high and some paradoxical results are observed.
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Article dans une revue
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2012, 41 (2), pp.263--279. 〈10.1007/s00355-012-0683-1〉
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http://hal.univ-reunion.fr/hal-01243433
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Soumis le : mardi 15 décembre 2015 - 07:37:26
Dernière modification le : jeudi 11 janvier 2018 - 06:20:26

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Fabrice Barthélémy, Dominique Lepelley, Mathieu Martin. On the likelihood of dummy players in weighted majority games. Social Choice and Welfare, Springer Verlag, 2012, 41 (2), pp.263--279. 〈10.1007/s00355-012-0683-1〉. 〈hal-01243433〉

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